The impact of capital structure on abnormal return: does family control impact?

Inês Lisboa

Abstract


Purpose: This study analyses the impact of family control in the relationship between abnormal returns and gearing for Portuguese listed firms. Moreover, it provides new evidence on this field taking into account firms’ heterogeneities, namely size effect.

Design/methodology/approach: This paper uses a panel data of Portuguese listed firms with different capital structure and various industries. The sample period is from 1999 to 2012.

Findings: The models results show that size effect causes inference on results. To small-size firms, abnormal return declines with firm’s gearing, but it increases with market gearing to large-size firms. To the overall sample firm’s gearing in insignificant in explaining the firm’s abnormal return. Moreover, firm’s performance and risk, and free-risk rate cause impact on abnormal return.

Practical implications: The paper conclusions are relevant for institutional and individual investors, since they have more information about Portuguese firms and about the impact of gearing on the firm’s abnormal return. Results are also important for practitioners, because it expands international evidence on abnormal return, which are focused on large countries as the U.K. and the U.S.

Originality/value: The majority of the studies in this research area focus on the impact of gearing on abnormal returns. This study goes a step further introducing the impact of family control on this relationship. Moreover, I also take into account the firm’s heterogeneities, offering new insights to this stream.

 

Keywords: Family Firms, family control, F-PEC scale, Abnormal returns, Capital Structure, Gearing.

 

 

[PT]

Título: "O Impacto da Estrutura de Capital no Retorno Anormal: O Controle da Família Impacta?"

Resumo

Objetivos: Este estudo analisa o impacto do controle da família na relação entre retornos anormais e engrenagens para empresas listadas em português. Além disso, fornece novas evidências nesse campo, levando em consideração as heterogeneidades das empresas, ou seja, o efeito do tamanho.

Desenho/metodologia/abordagem: Este artigo utiliza dados em painel de empresas listadas em Portugal com diferentes estruturas de capital e vários setores. O período da amostra é de 1999 a 2012.

Resultados: Os resultados do modelo mostram que o efeito do tamanho causa inferência nos resultados. Para empresas de pequeno porte, o retorno anormal diminui com a engrenagem da empresa, mas aumenta com a engrenagem do mercado para empresas de grande porte. Para a empresa de amostra geral, a orientação é insignificante para explicar o retorno anormal da empresa. Além disso, o desempenho e o risco da empresa e a taxa de risco livre causam impacto no retorno anormal.

Implicações: as conclusões do artigo são relevantes para investidores institucionais e individuais, pois possuem mais informações sobre empresas portuguesas e sobre o impacto da engrenagem no retorno anormal da empresa. Os resultados também são importantes para os profissionais, pois ampliam as evidências internacionais de retorno anormal, focadas em grandes países como o Reino Unido e os EUA.

Originalidade/valor: A maioria dos estudos nesta área de pesquisa concentra-se no impacto da engrenagem em retornos anormais. Este estudo vai além, introduzindo o impacto do controle da família nessa relação. Além disso, também levo em conta as heterogeneidades da empresa, oferecendo novas idéias para esse fluxo.

 

Palavras-chave: Empresas familiares, controle familiar, escala F-PEC, retornos anormais, estrutura de capital, engrenagem.



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