Corporate Governance: Board of Directors’ Independence in Emerging Economies

Semiu Babatunde Adeymi, Simon Ademola Akinteye, Ini Etete Udofia

Abstract


Purpose: The board of directors remains an important corporate governance mechanism through which the shareholders can exercise control over the activities of the firm, monitor and exercise oversight over the top executives and managers. In order to achieve this objective, the board of directors must be independent. This paper provides evidence using data from Nigeria on the degree of independence of the boards of directors of listed firms.

Design/ methodology/ approach: The research employs the qualitative design using a cross sectional two-stage interview consisting of an initial and follow up process.

Findings: Using concept mapping mindset and qualitative data analytical tools, the study finds that the boards of directors of the listed firms were independent and active. They functioned as an active corporate governance mechanism, exercising control and oversight over the affairs of the firms and their top executives.

Research Limitations/ implications: A potential limitation of this study could be the use of a small sample size of six Boards of Directors and biases associated with an opinionaire. The findings of the study may not be generalizable, beyond emerging economies. 

Originality/ Value: This research paper applies qualitative research method to examine the indicators of board independence in listed firms. It identifies the gap in legal framework codification and makes a case for non-proliferation of codes of corporate governance in emerging economies. It provides assurance of the relative independence of the board of directors in the listed firms studied, thereby expanding the body of literature in the research domain.

 

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Board independence, corporate governance mechanism.

 

 

[PT]

Título: "Governança Corporativa: Independência do Conselho de Administração em Economias Emergentes"

Resumo

Objetivo: O conselho de administração continua sendo um importante mecanismo de governança corporativa, através do qual os acionistas podem exercer controle sobre as atividades da empresa, monitorar e supervisionar os principais executivos e gerentes. Para atingir esse objetivo, o conselho de administração deve ser independente. Este artigo fornece evidências usando dados da Nigéria sobre o grau de independência dos conselhos de administração das empresas listadas.

Design/metodologia/abordagem: A pesquisa emprega o design qualitativo usando uma entrevista transversal de duas etapas, que consiste em um processo inicial e de acompanhamento.

Resultados: Utilizando a mentalidade de mapeamento conceitual e ferramentas analíticas de dados qualitativos, o estudo constata que os conselhos de administração das empresas listadas eram independentes e ativos. Eles funcionavam como um mecanismo ativo de governança corporativa, exercendo controle e supervisão sobre os assuntos das empresas e de seus principais executivos.

Limitações/implicações: Uma limitação potencial deste estudo pode ser o uso de uma pequena amostra de seis conselhos de administração e vieses associados a um parecer. Os resultados do estudo podem não ser generalizáveis, além das economias emergentes.

Originalidade/valor: Este trabalho de pesquisa aplica um método de pesquisa qualitativa para examinar os indicadores de independência do conselho em empresas listadas. Ele identifica a lacuna na codificação da estrutura legal e defende a não proliferação de códigos de governança corporativa nas economias emergentes. Ele fornece garantia da relativa independência do conselho de administração nas empresas listadas estudadas, expandindo assim o corpo de literatura no domínio da pesquisa.

 

Palavras-chave: Governança Corporativa, Conselho de Administração, Independência do Conselho, Mecanismo de Governança Corporativa.


Full Text:

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